TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND FREEDOM FIGHTER

NOOR ALAM KHAN ASC Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan & Chairman, Voice of Prisoners Member KPK Bar Council, Peshawar

Fright, dread or an apprehension in the mind of a person induced by a horrible act of a person or causing fear and terror to the people is "terrorism" and if an act done by a person is a source of terror in any section of people which may cause damage to life or property of an individual is a "terrorist act". "Terrorism" is to be determined from the criminal act designed to create a sense of fear or insecurity in the minds of the general public disturbing even tempo of life and tranquillity of the society. In other words Word 'Terrorism', inter cilia would mean the use or threat of action, where use or threat was designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government or the public; or a section of public or community; or sect orcreate a sense of fear or insecurity in society; and would create a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of public; or was designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business; and disrupt civil life. The sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response

“A person fighting against a government or invading force; a rebel or revolutionary” is called as insurgent. Defining insurgency is equally problematic. Insurgency is perhaps best understood by first considering what it is not. Insurgency is not conventional war or terrorism, for example, but it shares with them the use of force to achieve a political end.

Whereas “A person who takes part in a revolutionary struggle to achieve a political goal, especially in order to overthrow their government” may be called as freedom fighter.

It is hard, we are then told, to know exactly where the line exists between terrorists and the brave would-be liberators of oppressed people–freedom fighters. Besides, many nations in the world have come into existence after lengthy struggles for liberation. Many pundits assert that the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter is purely a matter of perception. When our guy kills in battle, he’s a freedom fighter; when our enemy does, he is a terrorist. Similar acts get different labels depending on who is doing the labeling.

In making a judgment on freedom fighters versus terrorists, there is more at work than a "perception." There is a metaphysical difference, not just a perceptual one, between these two descriptors. It is helpful to get at the difference with an analogy, a consideration of the important difference between two of the seven deadly sins: greed and envy

Western democracies have had difficulty responding to the new reality of global violent extremist terrorism. Two themes run through the long history of irregular warfare. The first is that all types of irregular warfare, including terrorism and insurgency, are appealing to those who seek to change the status quo, but what role can politics possibly play for those who are willing to kill themselves and others for rewards in the afterlife

If no single definition of terrorism produces a precise, unambiguous description, we can approach the question by eliminating similar activities that are not terrorism, but that appear to overlap. For the U.S. military, two such related concepts probably lead to more confusion than others. Guerrilla warfare and insurgencies are often assumed to be synonymous with terrorism. One reason for this is that insurgencies and terrorism often have similar goals. However, if we examine insurgency and guerrilla warfare, specific differences emerge. A key difference is that aninsurgency is a movement - a political effort with a specific aim. This sets it apart from both guerrilla warfare and terrorism, as they are both methods available to pursue the goals of the political movement.

Terrorism is continually changing. While at the surface it remains "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear…" it is rapidly becoming the predominant strategic tool of our adversaries. As terrorism evolves into the principal irregular warfare strategy of the 21st century, it is adapting to changes in the world socio-political environment. Some of these changes facilitate the abilities of terrorists to operate, procure funding, and develop new capabilities. Other changes are gradually moving terrorism into a different relationship with the world at large.

In order to put these changes into context, it will be necessary to look at the historical evolution of terrorism, with each succeeding evolution building upon techniques pioneered by others. This evolution is driven by ongoing developments in the nature of conflict and international relations. It is also necessary to consider some of the possible causes of future conflicts, in order to understand the actors and their motivations

Insurgents and terrorists fighting irregular wars require internal or external support to sustain their struggle. Terrorists and insurgent leaders need to convey the reason for their actions or lose sympathy for its cause. They often seek to legitimize their use of violence and translate this into meaningful support for their cause by demonstrating moral superiority over those who represent the state, supplanting the functions of the state at the local level, and spreading a persuasive message.

The continuous threat of terrorism has thrust domestic preparedness obligations to the very top of the law enforcement agenda. For today’s law enforcement executive, the capacity to assess and manage risk is imperative. In the post September 11 era, this capacity must be considered as much a staple of law enforcement operations as crime analysis, criminal intelligence, and crime prevention. The consequences of failing to assess and manage terrorist threats and risk could be incalculable.

The dynamic adaptive nature of terrorism requires a systematic and methodical intelligent strategy for terrorism threat assessment and management. Unwitting weaknesses in approach and deficiencies in scope invite strategic surprise. Effective decision-making on managing terrorism risk benefits from insights available from quantitative thinking across the range of significant risk factors. This way of thinking about terrorism is presented in a manner accessible to military and security personnel, emphasizing key conceptual principles and ideas, whilst minimizing technical mathematical detail.

Risk assessment and management concepts and methodologies are evolving rapidly. Although models differ in the definition, labeling, and sequencing of steps, there is solid consensus on the essential components. In this monograph, each component is defined and briefly examined. Protocols are supplied to quantify/calculate criticality, threat, vulnerability, and risk.

Experience and skill with risk assessment and management are limited in many law enforcement agencies. To assist in reversing this situation, this report supplies capacity building information that includes promising programs, software, and training references. Capacity “acquisition” through shared/ regional arrangements is not only economically practical for many agencies, it promises to leverage effectiveness for all agencies by pooling and coordinating information and planning joint countermeasures

The efficiency of metropolitan crisis management depends on a reliable up-to-date image of urban vulnerability to the different modes of terrorist attack. Mobile security assets should be deployed where they are most needed. With intensive counter-terrorism measures instinctively taken by a government to protect its own critical property, there will be a deflected terrorism risk dispersed among softer commercial targets. Commercial property is generally not heavily defended.

Organizing protection requires a clear understanding of terrorism risk, so that efforts at corporate risk mitigation are prioritized in a financially optimal manner. More than for government and civic authorities, terrorism security expenditure for commercial organizations has to be justified on a cost-benefit basis. Security is costly, both in terms of manpower and equipment, hence security measures at a particular location should match the local terrorist threat.

Especially during a terrorist crisis, decision-makers should be taking calculated, rather than reckless risks. Information overload can lead to poor decisions. Processing of risk information is expedited by prior risk calculation, which involves extensive computer simulation of large numbers of possible threat/counter-terrorism outcomes, graded according to plausibility. To quantify a terrorist threat, a number of risk metrics can be calculated. Serving as a medium-term reference baseline is the annualized average human or economic loss, segmented according to geography, and attack mode. A key risk metric during a terrorist crisis is the likelihood of mass casualties or enormous economic loss, and the cost-effectiveness of risk mitigation measures or crisis management action. Red-teaming exercises can be extended in a risk direction by evaluating the risk implications of alternative terrorist moves.

Common to all risk metrics is an estimation of loss consequent on a terrorist attack being successful. Loss estimation involves a series of problems in the domain of the engineering, physical, chemical and biological sciences: evaluating the blast effect of a bomb detonation; the extent of fire from a fuel tanker explosion; the radiation fall-out from a radiological dispersal device; the spread of contagion from a smallpox outbreak etc. These problems are technically complex and challenging, but at least the core computational models for blast analysis, conflagration, atmospheric dispersion, pollution transport, epidemiology etc. are founded on consensus scientific principles

Eradication involves the physical destruction of the insurgents or terrorists, although few would go so far as to follow Robert Taber’s rhetorical advice: ‘There is only one means of defeating an insurgent people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to control a territory that harbors resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert’ (Taber 1972: 11). The state has numerous advantages over its opponents given its control over social, fiscal, and military resources. The most important question in democratic states is whether or not the leaders of the state can apply their resources effectively to extinguish the insurgent flame without alienating popular support for their own authority. Cultural context matters when determining a response. For example, the leaders of some European countries were hesitant to cast actions against al-Qaeda after September 2001 as a ‘war’ for cultural and political reasons based on their historical experience. Indeed many continued to see the phenomenon of violent extremist terrorism exclusively as a domestic law-enforcement issue within their sovereign borders, requiring civilian police or paramilitary forces, and not as a global problem that might require the use of military forces.

Regardless of the forces used, theory and doctrine is rife with plans that discuss the destruction of guerrillas. These plans range from French Marshal Lyautey’s innocuous– sounding ‘oil patch’ method applied in Morocco in the first quarter of the twentieth century to the more sinister-sounding Nazi German ‘spider’s web’ and ‘partridge drive’ tactics. All theorists agree that eliminating the insurgents’ safe havens must be a priority. Numbers also make a difference. US counter-insurgency doctrine as stated in the Army Field Manual, which is a doctrine manual guiding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that was produced in response to the difficulties faced by US and coalition forces in dealing with the problem of contemporary insurgency, suggests that 20–25 personnel are required for every 1000 inhabitants (Department of the Army 2007: 23). Most theorists also assert that ‘special forces’ are also needed to defeat the irregulars at their own game. Some advocate the use of technologies not available to the insurgents, such as helicopters and remote sensors, to enhance the force-to-space balance between government and irregular forces and to achieve superior mobility.

CONCLUSION

States will be plagued by terrorism and irregular warfare as long as individuals are willing to use violence for political purposes. The shocking cultural details of irregular conflicts, such as al-Qaeda’s recorded beheadings of captives and the use of starvation as a weapon in Sudan and Somalia, can obscure the political purpose behind the fighting and irregular warfare have long been used to change political systems and acquire power; more recently, cultural schisms have led to a rise in terrorism carried out for religious and personal reasons.

Current re-evaluations of irregular warfare and terrorism often lack context. Religion, culture, ethnicity, and technology remain important elements of irregular warfare. They define how and why individuals take up arms against perceived injustices, but the ultima ratio for the use of irregular methods of war is to achieve political results. US militia and patriot groups, for instance, hope to provoke a response to redress the politicalimbalance between what they perceive as illegitimate federal authorities and individuals’ rights and freedoms established in the Constitution. Terrorist use of WMD is a frightening prospect.

Warrior cultures may appear to espouse violence for its own sake but at the root of their struggle is the quest for political autonomy, control, or power. The protracted guerrilla war fought by the Chechens against the Russians is little different from the one conducted in 1856: the Chechens’ desire is to gain political autonomy from Moscow. Somali warlords seek to gain political power and influence for their clans. Native Americans fought against the US Army in the nineteenth century to maintain autonomy and protect their traditional hunting grounds. Even ancient irregulars, classified as barbarii by the Romans, were resisting attempts to have Pax Romana imposed upon them.

After all, primordial violence (the people) serves no purpose unless it is subordinated ultimately to policy (the government). Violence undertaken for personal gain, be it financial or to enhance one’s reputation, is nothing more than a criminal act in civil society and should be treated as such.